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prevalence of ‘mixed-member majoritarian’ electoral systems, attempts to develop aggregative 
political party systems, and constraints upon the formation of small, ethnic or regional parties. I 
argue that these political reforms have increasingly converged on an identifiable "Asian model" of 
institutional design. 
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Democratization and Political Reform in the Asia-Pacific: Is There an 
‘Asian Model’ of Institutional Design? 
 
 
ABSTRACT: One of the little-noticed consequences of the democratization of 
the Asia-Pacific has been reforms to key political institutions such as electoral 
systems, political parties, and parliaments. I argue that, across the region, 
these reforms have been motivated by common aims of increasing 
government stability, reducing political fragmentation, and limiting the 
potential for ethnic politics. As a result, similar strategies of institutional 
design are evident in areas such as the increasing prevalence of ‘mixed-
member majoritarian’ electoral systems, attempts to develop aggregative 
political party systems, and constraints upon the formation of small, ethnic or 
regional parties. I argue that these political reforms have increasingly 
converged on an identifiable "Asian model" of institutional design.  
Benjamin Reilly: Democratization and Political Reform in the Asia-Pacific 
 3
 
Democratization and Political Reform in the Asia-Pacific: Is There an 
‘Asian Model’ of Institutional Design? 
 
The past decade has been a period of major political reform in the Asia-Pacific 
region. More governments are elected in competitive, freely contested 
elections today than ever before. Thailand and the Philippines now appear to 
have joined Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as genuine competitive 
democracies. In addition, both Indonesia and East Timor have navigated the 
initial challenges of democratization by holding successful transitional 
elections. All of this represents a dramatic change in the nature of Asian 
regimes: from what a decade ago was a region dominated by authoritarian 
governments, there is now a clear trend towards democracy being the 
accepted means for choosing and changing a country’s political leadership.1 
 
One consequence of this movement towards democracy has been the reform 
of democratic institutions such as electoral systems. Electoral systems 
represent a particularly important democratic institution because they 
determine how votes won in an election are translated into seats won in 
parliament, and are the central ‘rule of the game’ affecting who governs. The 
formative role of elections in shaping broader norms of political behaviour 
means that they are also “the most specific manipulable instrument of 
                                                 
1 See John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh and David Newman (eds) 2002, How Asia Votes, Chatham House Publishers, 
New York. 
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politics”2, and can be designed to achieve specific objectives and outcomes. 
Thus Lijphart writes that “if one wants to change the nature of a particular 
democracy, the electoral system is likely to be the most suitable and effective 
instrument for doing so”.3 
 
This paper argues that many of the electoral system changes in the Asia-
Pacific region in recent years have attempted exactly this kind of political 
manipulation, via the common aim of reducing instability by promoting 
cohesive political parties and limiting party fragmentation. These have been 
driven by several distinctive patterns of political reform across the region, 
including the increasing prevalence of mixed-member electoral systems, the 
distinctively majoritarian nature of these systems, and attempts to engineer 
political party systems. The nature and similarities of these reforms are such 
that they constitute an emerging ‘Asian model’ of institutional design.  
 
Democratization in the Asia-Pacific  
The democratization of East Asia deserves to be seen as a historic shift in the 
region’s affairs.4 Major transitions from authoritarian rule towards democracy 
began with the “people power” uprising in the Philippines in 1986 and the 
negotiated transitions to democracy in South Korea and Taiwan in 1987, 
before moving on to Thailand in 1992, Cambodia in 1993, Indonesia in 1998, 
                                                 
2 Sartori, G. 1968, ‘Political Development and Political Engineering’, Public Policy, 17, p. 273. 
3 Lijphart, A. 1995, ‘Electoral Systems’, in S.M. Lipset (ed), The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Congressional 
Quarterly Press, Washington DC., p. 412. 
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and East Timor (following international intervention) in 2001. Of course, not 
all of these transitions to democracy are assured, and the democratization 
wave is far from universal: politics in China, for one, remains firmly under the 
control of the Communist Party, despite an economic transformation. 
Likewise, Vietnam, Burma, Laos and North Korea have shown little sign of 
adopting democracy.  
 
There are significant regional variations in the extent and timing of 
democratization across the region. In North Asia, the democratic triumvirate 
of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are some of the longest-established 
democracies in East Asia -- and Japan deserves to be seen as being in a class of 
its own given that it has been a stable (if remarkably non-competitive) 
democracy for almost 50 years. If “democratic consolidation” is a measure of 
the staying-power of democratic rule, then this group could be considered to 
be consolidated democracies: it is unlikely that democracy could be 
overturned in any of these countries. For example, it is notable that South 
Korea, despite the severe economic difficulties it suffered as a result of the 
Asian economic downturn, has shown no signs of flirting with a return to 
authoritarianism -- and in fact elected the region’s foremost democracy 
activist, Kim Dae Jung, as its President in 1997. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
4 See Lee, J. 2002. ‘Primary Causes of Asian Democratization’, Asian Survey 42(6):821-837. 
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Turning to South-East Asia, the Philippines and Thailand are now clearly the 
two best-established democracies amongst the ASEAN member states. Both, 
for example, have experienced successive elections and, importantly, peaceful 
turnovers of government as a result of the electoral process. Depending on 
how the ongoing process of democracy unfolds, Indonesia may join this club 
at some stage in the next decade. It will hold its second consecutive free 
election in 2004. There is also the case of East Timor – a new democracy born 
out of the crucible of a liberation struggle and international intervention, but 
which appears to be moving quite quickly to becoming one of the region’s 
firmly democratic states. However, while the democratization of all of these 
countries is proceeding rapidly, none could yet be said to be truly 
consolidated in the sense of democracy being considered the “only game in 
town” and any reversion from it unthinkable.5 
 
Then there are the semi-democratic or ‘soft’ authoritarian regimes, principally 
Malaysia and Singapore – neither of which have experienced a turnover of 
power since independence, but both of which maintain regular and fraud-free 
electoral processes. In these cases, the fairness of the electoral process is 
biased not through outright manipulation as much as via restrictions on 
opposition parties’ right to campaign openly, a compliant judiciary and a pro-
government press. Cambodia should probably be seen as a borderline 
                                                 
5 This is the definition suggested by Adam Przeworski 1991, Democracy and the Market, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
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member of this group, due to the violence and intimidation that accompanied 
the flawed 1998 and (to a lesser extent) 2003 elections there. 
 
Finally, there are the ongoing outright authoritarian regimes in the region – 
North Korea, China, Vietnam, Brunei, Laos and Burma/Myanmar – in which 
elections are either not held at all, or do not involve a contest for actual 
political power. Although some democratic reforms and innovations are 
taking place amongst this group (opposition candidates have been allowed to 
contest elections in Laos, for example, while competitive village-level 
elections have been held in China), in general elections in these countries are 
empty and stage-managed exercises. I will therefore not be dealing with the 
electoral systems of these countries in this paper. 
 
Probably the best-known measure of democracy is the annual rankings of civil and 
political rights produced by the US private foundation Freedom House. The Freedom 
House rankings for the Asia-Pacific in the 30 years from 1972 to 2002 are shown at 
Table One, and tend to support the other judgements. Using the Freedom House 
criteria, five countries – Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand – 
are ranked as “free”. East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are all adjudged 
as “partly free”, although their trajectories run in different directions, with Indonesia 
and East Timor having improved their rankings while Malaysia and Singapore have 
regressed. The others – Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, and 
Vietnam -- are all adduced as being “not free”, although again there is enormous 
variation within this group, with some countries having held at least partly free 
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elections in the 1990s (eg Cambodia) while others remain completely dominated by 
authoritarian rule (eg North Korea).
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Table One: Freedom House Rankings of Political Rights and Civil Liberties in the Asia-Pacific, 1972-2002 
Year Brunei Burma Cambodia China E. Timor Indonesia Japan Korea, N. Korea, S. Laos Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand Vietnam 
1972-73 6,5,NF 7,5,NF 6,5,NF 7,7,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 5,6,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 4,6,PF 5,5,PF 6,5,NF 7,5,NF - 
1973-74 6,5,NF 7,5,NF 6,5,NF 7,7,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 4,6,PF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 6,5,NF 6,3,PF - 
1974-75 6,5,NF 7,5,NF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 5,6,PF 5,5,PF 3,3,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 6,5,NF 5,3,PF - 
1975-76 6,5,NF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 6,5,NF 2,3,F - 
1976-77 6,5,NF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 5,6,NF 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF 
1977-78 6,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 5,5,PF 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 5,4,PF 6,5,NF 7,7,NF 
1978-79 6,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 5,5,PF 7,7,NF 3,3,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 5,4,PF 6,4,PF 7,7,NF 
1979-80 6,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,5,NF - 5,5,PF 2,1,F 7,7,NF 4,5,PF 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 4,3,PF 7,7,NF 
1980-81 6,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,5,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 5,6,PF 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 5,6,PF 3,4,PF 7,7,NF 
1981-82 6,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,5,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 5,6,PF 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 7,7,NF 
1982-83 6,5,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,5,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 5,6,PF 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,4,PF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 7,6,NF 
1983-84 6,5,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,5,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 5,6,PF 7,7,NF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 7,6,NF 
1984-85 6,6,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,6,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 5,5,PF 7,7,NF 3,5,PF 4,4,PF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 7,6,NF 
1985-86 6,5,PF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,6,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 4,5,PF 7,7,NF 3,5,PF 4,3,PF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 3,4,PF 7,7,NF 
1986-87 6,5,PF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,6,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 4,5,PF 7,7,NF 3,5,PF 4,2,PF 4,5,PF 5,5,PF 3,3,PF 7,7,NF 
1987-88 6,5,PF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,6,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 4,4,PF 7,7,NF 3,5,PF 2,2,F 4,5,PF 5,4,PF 3,3,PF 6,7,NF 
1988-89 6,6,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF - 5,5,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 2,3,F 6,6,NF 4,5,PF 2,3,F 4,5,PF 5,3,PF 3,3,PF 6,7,NF 
1989-90 6,6,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF - 5,5,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 2,3,F 6,7,NF 5,4,PF 2,3,F 4,4,PF 4,3,PF 2,3,F 7,7,NF 
1990-91 6,5,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF 7,7,NF - 6,5,PF 1,1,F 7,7,NF 2,3,F 6,7,NF 5,4,PF 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 3,3,PF 2,3,F 7,7,NF 
1991-92 6,5,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF - 6,5,PF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,3,F 6,7,NF 5,4,PF 3,3,PF 4,4,PF 5,5,PF 6,4,PF 7,7,NF 
1992-93 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF - 6,5,PF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,3,F 7,6,NF 5,4,PF 3,3,PF 4,5,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF 7,7,NF 
1993-94 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 4,5,PF 7,7,NF - 7,6,NF 2,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 4,5,PF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 4,4,PF 3,5,PF 7,7,NF 
1994-95 7,6,NF 7,7,NF 4,5,PF 7,7,NF - 7,6,NF 2,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 4,5,PF 3,4,PF 5,5,PF 3,3,PF 3,5,PF 7,7,NF 
1995-96 7,5,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF - 7,6,NF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 4,5,PF 2,4,PF 5,5,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF 7,7,NF 
1996-97 7,5,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF 7,7,NF - 7,5,NF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 4,5,PF 2,3,F 4,5,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 7,7,NF 
1997-98 7,5,NF 7,7,NF 7,6,NF 7,7,NF - 7,5,NF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 4,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 2,2,F 3,3,PF 7,7,NF 
1998-99 7,5,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF 7,6,NF - 6,4,PF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 7,7,NF 
1999-00 7,5,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF 7,6,NF 6,4,PF 4,4,PF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 2,2,F 2,3,F 7,7,NF 
2000-01 7,5,NF 7,7,NF 6,6,NF 7,6,NF 6,3,PF 3,4,PF 1,2,F 7,7,NF 2,2,F 7,6,NF 5,5,PF 2,3,F 5,5,PF 1,2,F 2,3,F 7,6,NF 
2001-02 7,5 NF 7,7 NF 6,5 NF 7,6 NF 5,3 PF 3,4 PF 1,2 F 7,7 NF 2,2 F 7,7 NF 5,5 PF 2,3 F 5,5 PF 1,2 F 2,3 F 7,6 NF 
Note:  The characters representing scores for each year are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, and freedom status. Each of the first two is 
measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for 
“free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated 
"free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.”  
Source: Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls.) 
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Despite their marked differences in levels of democracy and democratic 
consolidation, there has been a convergence in patterns of political reform in 
the Asia-Pacific’s electoral democracies -- Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and East Timor -- over the past decade.6 The 
remainder of this paper examines this convergence in the field of electoral 
reform, looking both at the institutional characteristics of systems chosen as 
well as their intended outcomes. 
 
Electoral Systems 
 
The most striking movement in terms of electoral systems in the Asia-Pacific 
has been the increasing enthusiasm for “mixed-member” systems – that is, 
where part of the parliament is elected by proportional representation (PR), 
part by some type of plurality or majority method. As in other world regions, 
such systems have become increasingly popular in Asia in recent years, 
perhaps because they appear to combine the benefits of proportional election 
outcomes with district-level representation.  
 
Mixed systems can be divided into two broad systemic categories, parallel 
and compensatory (also known as ‘unlinked’ and ‘linked’) systems. Parallel 
mixed-member systems run district-level and elections and a national party 
                                                 
6 For an excellent recent survey of Asian electoral systems, see Allen Hicken and Yuko Kasuya. 2003. ‘A 
guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of east, south and southeast Asia’, Electoral 
Studies 22:121-151. 
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list vote concurrently (hence the term ‘parallel’). Because of this, parallel 
systems are generally classified as semi-proportional, producing outcomes 
that fall somewhere between the strict proportionality of PR systems and the 
distorted results of plurality-majority forms. By contrast, compensatory 
systems link the two electoral systems so that the allocation of list seats is 
dependent at some level of the results from the district elections. In most cases, 
such as New Zealand, this results in broadly proportional outcomes. While 
parallel systems have been chosen by many Asia-Pacific states, none currently 
use compensatory systems.7 
 
The adoption of mixed systems in the Asia-Pacific has occurred in two 
different contexts. In North Asia, mixed systems have been introduced mostly 
as a replacement for the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). In South-East 
Asia, by contrast, mixed systems have been introduced as a replacement for 
the block vote (BV). Both SNTV and BV are variations on a standard plurality 
electoral system, and were once widespread for elections throughout Asia. 
Under SNTV, each elector has one vote but there are several seats in the 
district to be filled, and the candidates with the highest number of votes fill 
these positions. This system was formerly used in Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea, and is still used to elect the district seats in Taiwan’s mixed-member 
system.  
 
                                                 
7 See Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly 1997, The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design, 
International IDEA, Stockholm. 
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Across Asia, the rejection of SNTV and BV systems as part of political reforms 
through the 1990s resulted in the introduction of parallel mixed-member 
systems to combine two divergent system types, such as PR and plurality in 
Thailand, or PR with SNTV in Taiwan. South Korea should be seen as the 
instigator of this movement, as it first adopted a parallel mixed-member 
system in 1963.8 Taiwan was the next to introduce the party list option, 
moving to a SNTV/PR combination in 1992, followed by Japan in 1994 and, in 
1996, a revision of Korea’s system to make the allocation of list seats truly 
proportional. Since then, the Philippines, Thailand and East Timor have all 
followed suit. 
 
Japan is probably the best-known case of the change to a mixed system in 
Asia. Japan’s choice of a mixed system was in large part a reaction to the 
strategic impacts of the SNTV system, which it had used for many decades. 
Because SNTV enables parties to put forward multiple candidates in each 
district, and hence for members of the same party to run in competition with 
one another, it encourages intra-party competition. As the region’s only long-
term “established” democracy, Japan’s electoral reforms were stimulated not 
just by a decline in public confidence in SNTV, which was widely seen as 
having encouraged intra-party factionalism and hence corruption, but also by 
a deliberate attempt to change the way the political system operated by 
                                                 
8 South Korea thus has some claims to having invented this model of elections, contra the common 
misconception that non-compensatory mixed systems were invented in Eastern Europe before being 
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manipulating of the electoral system, an approach that has been followed by 
other Asian countries more recently.  
 
Since 1994, Japan has thus utilized a parallel mixed-member system, with 300 
seats elected by plurality rules in single-member constituencies, and a PR list 
(using the d'Hondt method) for the remaining 180 seats. The allocation of 
these proportional seats is based on the parties' share of the national vote in 
11 large multi-member districts. However, candidates are allowed to transfer 
between the party lists and the single-member districts, creating an unusual 
“dual-candidate” system which appears to have undermined some of the 
goals of electoral reform, such as the creation of less personalistic and more 
programmatic political parties.9 
 
Predating the Japanese reforms, Taiwan first adopted a mixed system for its 
Legislative Yuan elections in 1992, but has continued to use SNTV for the 
district-based component of elections, which comprises 80 percent of the 225 
seats in the Yuan. The other 20 percent of legislative seats are for national 
representatives (including eight overseas Chinese representatives) elected by 
PR in two nationwide constituencies. Unlike the Japanese version, however, 
electors are not given a separate vote for these national constituencies. Rather, 
                                                                                                                                            
taken up by other states like Japan and Taiwan. See S. Birch 2003, Electoral Systems and Political 
Transformation in Post-Communist Europe. Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire and New York, p. 32. 
9 See McKean, Margaret and Scheiner, Ethan. 2000. ‘Japan’s new electoral system: la plus ca change …’, 
Electoral Studies 19:447-477. 
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national seats are allocated to parties who poll more than 5% of the vote in the 
SNTV seats in proportion to their vote share at the district level.  
 
The South Korean experience of mixed systems has, until recently, 
represented a third approach to electoral reform. Over the years, Korea has 
experimented with several different combinations of mixed system in which 
local districts and national PR lists have been combined in a variety of ways. 
At the time of writing, of the Korean National Assembly’s 273 seats (reduced 
from 299 prior to the April 2000 elections as a means of cost saving), 227 are 
elected from single-member constituencies by a plurality formula, while the 
remaining 46 are chosen from a national constituency by proportional 
representation. These seats are divided proportionately among the political 
parties based upon their votes obtained in the districts, on condition that they 
have obtained at least 5% of the total valid votes cast. Prior to 1996, however, 
the national list seats were given to parties on the bases of their seat share at 
district elections, meaning that the national seats usually exacerbated any 
disproportionality at the local level.  
 
These North-East Asian cases can collectively be seen as a ‘democratic club’ in 
which divergent approaches to reform have resulted in a surprisingly high 
degree of similarity in electoral models. A similar conclusion applies to the 
two best-established democracies in South-East Asia, the Philippines and 
Thailand, which have also undergone major electoral reforms in recent years. 
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In both cases they replaced the block vote (BV) described earlier, and today 
only Laos continues to use the BV for its elections.  
 
Under its 1987 Constitution, the Philippines adopted a mixed system in which 
80% of the 250 House of Representatives seats are elected from single-member 
districts via a plurality formula, and the remaining 20% are chosen from a 
national list. These lists seats, however, are not open to established parties but 
are designed to represent “sectoral interests” and marginalized groups such 
as youth, labour, the urban poor, farmers, fishermen and women. Each group 
can put up a maximum of three candidates, and any group securing 2% of the 
party-list vote gets a seat, up to a maximum of three seats. However, the list 
seats have been dogged by problems. In 1998, only 14 of the 52 list seats were 
filled, as electoral authorities struggled to verify the credentials of elected 
groups. In 2001, ten parties and organizations surpassed the 2% threshold, 
although again less than one-third of all available seats were filled. Following 
the 2001 elections, the Supreme Court found that most of the groups elected 
did not in fact represent minorities, and that some indeed had links to the 
major parties. Less than half of the elected party-list members have so far 
taken up their seats.10 To further complicate matters, up to 20 or more 
positions are filled at each election – and candidate names do not appear on 
                                                 
10 R. J. May, 2002, ‘Elections in the Philippines, May 2001’, Electoral Studies, Volume 21(4):673-680. 
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the ballot papers, but have to be written in by voters, creating practical 
difficulties in a country where literacy remains a problem.11 
 
Like the Philippines, Thailand has also moved away from the block vote to a 
mixed system in which 80% of the parliament’s 500 seats are elected from 
local constituencies, and the remaining 20% of the seats are elected from a 
national party list. This exercise in institutional engineering has created two 
classes of politicians with radically divergent career incentives for election. 
The district MPs must represent local areas and bring development 
opportunities to them; while the national MPs are explicitly charged with 
playing a role in issues of national, not local, importance. Parties competing 
for party-list seats must attain at least 5 percent of the vote, a provision which 
discriminates against splinter parties. This has resulted in a sharp drop in 
party system fractionalization, with the ‘effective’ number of parliamentary 
parties falling by half between 1995 and 2001.12 
 
The three other cases of democratization in South-East Asia – Indonesia, 
Cambodia and East Timor – have also experimented with mixed-member 
systems, but with significant variations. Each of these cases also demonstrate 
                                                 
11 See Montinola, Gabriella R. 1999. ‘Parties and accountability in the Philippines’, Journal of Democracy 
10(1):126-140. 
12 See Hicken, Allen. 2003. “From Province to Parliament: Party Aggregation in Developing 
Democracies.” Paper presented to the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Philadelphia, 28-31 August. 
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some of the underlying issues driving the adoption of mixed systems in the 
region.  
 
The electoral system used for Indonesia’s transitional 1999 elections was an 
unusual and possibly unique combination of party list PR with ‘personal vote’ 
characteristics. In an attempt to reward individually popular candidates 
without moving all the way to a district-based system, Indonesia’s political 
engineers effectively tried to graft an element of local representation onto a 
party-list PR system. They did this by specifying that the vote totals parties 
gained in each local government area (kapupatem) would determine which 
candidates from the party list would be elected. In theory, a locally-popular 
representative who attracted an above-average proportional of votes to the 
party in a particular district would thus have an increased chance of gaining a 
parliamentary seat. In practice, this procedure was almost impossible to 
administer, and the successful candidates ended up being chosen by the 
parties internally.  
 
For the 2004 elections, a more conventional form of ‘open list’ proportional 
representation was adopted. Unlike mixed-member systems, where some 
parliamentarians are elected from districts and some from national lists, all 
candidates were chosen from party lists, but voters were able to influence the 
composition of these lists by voting directly for a chosen candidate. However, 
this ‘open list’ provision had little influence on the final election outcomes, as 
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an exceptionally large number of personal votes were needed to alter a 
candidate’s position on the party list. Nonetheless, demands in Indonesia for 
some kind of district-based system remain strong, fuelled in part by the 
expectation that democratic prospects would be enhanced if the power of 
party elites was reduced and politics brought closer to the masses.13 In part in 
response to this, Indonesia’s 2004 elections were conducted under a PR 
system, but used much smaller electoral districts than previously, with a 
maximum of 12 members per district. This raised the threshold for election 
and made it difficult for smaller parties to win seats compared to the 1999 
elections, when districts were based around entire provinces.14 The effect of 
this – in keeping with the reforms in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines – 
was to make outcomes in Indonesia’s 2004 election more majoritarian than 
previously, with the elimination of a number of very small parties from the 
1999 parliament and a reduction in the number of parties overall.  
 
In Cambodia also, there has also been pressure for the introduction of some 
kind of district-based or mixed system due to concerns about the lack of 
accountability in the proportional system inherited from the United Nation 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia mission in 2003. Like Indonesia, 
Cambodia uses a list PR system in 23 constituencies based around the 
country's provinces, which results in broadly proportional outcomes. 
                                                 
13 See Andrew Ellis 2000. ‘The politics of electoral systems in transition: the 1999 elections in Indonesia 
and beyond’, Representation 37:241-248. 
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However, in response to the calls for greater local linkages and accountability 
between voting populations and their representatives, over one-third of these 
constituencies are actually single-member districts.15 Predictably, this has led 
the elimination of some small parties, and more majoritarian outcomes overall.  
 
The final case of electoral reform in process in the region, East Timor, also 
used a mixed-member model for its foundation elections in 2001. As in 
Cambodia, the majority of voters in East Timor are elected from the party lists, 
not from districts. For the August 2001 elections to the Constituent Assembly, 
the body charged with drawing up the new nation’s constitution, 75 seats 
were elected on a nationwide basis by proportional representation, and only 
13 seats (one for each district) by first-past-the-post. The Revolutionary Front 
for an Independent East Timor (FRETLIN) captured a majority of 55 seats in 
the 88-member Assembly, winning 43 of the 75 national seats and all of the 
available district seats. The Assembly has since transformed itself into a 
legislature and passed a new constitution which specifies that elections must 
be held under proportional representation for a much smaller parliament, so 
it is likely that future elections will be held under a straight PR system with 
no district level representation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
14 Stephen Sherlock 2004, ‘Consolidation and Change: The Indonesian Parliament after the 2004 
Elections’. Canberra: Centre for Democratic Institutions., p. 4. 
15 At the time of writing there were eight single-member constituencies in Cambodia, up from six in 
1993. 
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Table Two sets out the changes in electoral system across the democratic 
states of the region since 1990. 
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Table Two: Electoral Systems Changes in Asia Since 1990 
Country Former Electoral System New Electoral System 
Japan SNTV Mixed FPTP-PR (1994) 
Taiwan SNTV Mixed SNTV-PR (1992) 
Thailand Block Vote Mixed FPTP-PR (1997) 
Philippines Block Vote Mixed FPTP-PR (1998) 
South Korea* Mixed SNTV-PR Mixed FPTP-PR (1996) 
Indonesia  Closed List PR Open List PR (2004) 
Cambodia Closed List PR List PR with SMDs (2003) 
East Timor - Mixed FPTP-PR (2003) 
* The system adopted in South Korea 1988 delivered compensatory list seats to the party that 
won the most seats in the district contest, ensuring it an overall majority in the assembly. In 
1996, the list seats were de-linked from the district results, in order to make the overall result 
more proportional. 
 
 
The two remaining cases, the ‘soft-authoritarian’ states of Malaysia and 
Singapore, can be covered quickly. Malaysia, alone amongst the region, uses a 
standard Westminster system with first-past-the-post elections. Constituency 
boundaries are gerrymandered to favour the Malay community, and the 
electoral commission is a compliant servant of the government. Singapore’s 
system is similar, except that there are a range of single-member and multi-
member districts. While MPs for the single-member seats are elected by FPTP, 
most MPs are elected from multi-member districts known as Group 
Representation Constituencies, each returning between four and six members 
from a single list of party candidates. Voters choose between competing party 
lists rather than candidates, and the highest-polling party wins all seats in the 
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district. This has benefited Singapore’s ruling party, the PAP, which regularly 
wins over 90 percent of seats in parliament on a plurality of the vote. In the 
most recent elections in 2001, for example, the PAP won 82 out of 84 seats in 
Parliament on 73.6% of the vote. 
 
Political Parties 
In addition to the new electoral systems, reformers in a number of Asia states 
have also featured an attempt to ‘engineer’ the development of their nascent 
party systems by introducing new rules governing the formation, registration 
and campaigning of political parties.16 In Thailand, for example, the electoral 
reforms were just one of a number of measures designed to produce a more 
consolidated and stable political system, which included measures to combat 
vote-buying, the establishment of an elected but non-partisan Senate, the 
introduction of compulsory voting, and restrictions on ‘party hopping’. 17 The 
“self-restraining’ nature of the Thai state’s new institutional apparatus makes 
it a particularly interesting and possibly influential example of constitutional 
reform in the region.18  
 
Indonesia’s attempts to regulate its emerging party system have gone even 
further. Prior to Indonesia’s transitional 1999 election, over 200 new parties 
                                                 
16 For more on this, see Benjamin Reilly 2003. ‘Political Parties and Political Engineering in the Asia-
Pacific Region’, Asia Pacific Issues: Analysis from the East-West Center, 71:1-8. 
17 See Murray, David. 1998. ‘Thailand’s Recent Electoral Reforms’, Electoral Studies 17:525-535. 
18 See Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds) 1999. The Self-Restraining State: Power 
and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
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mushroomed, many with extremely limited support bases. In an attempt to 
combat the potentially disastrous consequences of party fragmentation, 
Indonesia’s political engineers introduced a complex series of incentives and 
constraints on party development. As a precondition to compete in the 
elections, all new party had to demonstrate that they had an established 
branch structure in more than half of Indonesia’s (then) 27 provinces, and 
within each of these provinces have established branches within over half of 
all regions and municipalities, before they could stand candidates. In addition, 
in order to combat the centripetal forces of party fragmentation, there were 
also strong systemic pressures for party amalgamation: parties which failed to 
gain more than 2% of all seats in the lower house of parliament, or at least 3% 
of all seats in both houses combined, had to merge with other parties to 
surmount these thresholds and contest future elections. These rules whittled 
down the field considerably: of 141 parties screened by the KPU, only 48 were 
approved to contest the 1999 elections, and only five gained significant 
representation: PDIP (led by President Megawati), Golkar (the party machine 
created by former President Soeharto), and the three Islamist parties, PAN, 
PPP and PKB.19 
 
These rules were further strengthened prior to the 2004 elections: new parties 
had to establish branches in two-thirds of Indonesia’s provinces and in two-
thirds of the regencies within those provinces. Each local-level party unit also 
                                                 
19 Suryadinata, Leo. 2002. Elections and Politics in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, pp. 90-92. 
Benjamin Reilly: Democratization and Political Reform in the Asia-Pacific 
 24
had to demonstrate that it had at least 1,000 members (or at least one-
thousandth of the population in smaller regencies). This led to a further drop 
in party numbers, with only 24 parties qualifying to contest the 2004 elections. 
However, unlike 1999, most of these parties proved to be electorally viable, 
and were also able to attract a spread of votes across the three main regions of 
Indonesia. Whereas the 1999 DPR was dominated by the “big five”, the 2004 
parliament features the “big seven”: the five main parties from 1999, plus the 
two new entrants in the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) and the Democrat 
Party (PD) created by presidential aspirant Susilo Bambang Yudhonyo. 20 As a 
result, while the number of parties in parliament declined, the effective 
number of parties actually rose from 5.4 in 1999 to 8.3 in 2004. 
 
Patterns of Reform 
Three clear trends in electoral system choice thus stand out when surveying 
the East Asian region as a whole. 
 
The first is the predominance of mixed electoral systems, structured to give 
electors both a vote for political parties from a party list (usually at a national 
level), and a vote at a district-level election for candidates. While mixed 
systems have been a popular innovation around the world over the past 
decade, the Asian version has been distinctive for several reasons.  
 
                                                 
20 See Sherlock, Stephen 2004, Consolidation and Change: The Indonesian Parliament after the 2004 Elections. 
Canberra: Centre for Democratic Institutions. 
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First, in all cases bar East Timor, mixed systems in the region are heavily 
weighted in favour of the majoritarian, single-member districts rather than 
the PR list. In Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, only 20 
percent of seats are elected from the national list. In Japan, the figure is 40 
percent. In all cases, the majority of seats in the legislature are elected from 
single-member seats. This stands in contrast to the international norm, where 
most mixed systems have an almost equal split between tiers. Only East 
Timor, which allocated 80% of all seats to the party list for its 2001 elections, 
went against this trend (see Table Three). This bias towards districts over lists 
may retard the development of more nationally-focussed and programmatic 
political parties in the region, as district-based systems are generally thought 
to provide lesser incentives towards national party formation than PR.  
 
A second way in which the adoption of mixed systems have been unusual is 
in the rejection of compensatory mechanisms in the allocation of list seats to 
balance for disproportionality arising out of the district-level competition. In 
contrast to countries like Germany, New Zealand, and Mexico, none of the 
Asian cases use list seats to adjust overall electoral outcomes in this manner 
(indeed, in one case – South Korea from 1963-96 – the list seats were awarded 
to the party which did best in the district seats, thus compounding rather than 
compensating for such imbalances). Rather, in each case the PR list runs in 
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parallel with the district contest, but with no interchange between the two.21 
This means that while smaller parties can legitimately hope to gain some 
representation from the lists seats, overall levels of proportionality will, in 
many cases, not be greatly improved unless parties have strong regional 
support and can thus win a fair share of the district-based seats. The effect of 
this is to reinforce the bias away from proportionality created by the 
structural breakdown between list and district seats.  
 
Most of the mixed-member electoral systems used in Asian countries are thus 
examples of what Shugart and Wattenberg call ‘mixed-member majoritarian’ 
(MMM) systems – that is, mixed member systems in which most seats are 
elected from districts, creating predominantly majoritarian electoral 
outcomes.22 This is not an accident. In cases like Thailand and the Philippines, 
for example, an overriding goal of constitutional and electoral reforms has 
been to strengthen executive government, combat parliamentary instability, 
and encourage the development of cohesive political parties. Proportional 
representation has been seen as inimical to all three goals. As Table Three 
                                                 
21 Although some scholars have incorrectly classified the Philippines as a compensatory system. See 
Louis Massicote and Andre Blais 1999. ‘Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical survey’, 
Electoral Studies 18, p. 353. 
22 Matthew S. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenburg (eds) 2001. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: the Best of 
Both Worlds? New York: Oxford University Press. Although they do not focus on Asian cases beyond 
Japan, Shugart and Wattenberg’s discussion of MMM systems from other regions may have relevance 
for the Asia-Pacific. Specifically they find that in most cases the adoption of MMM systems was the 
result of a compromise between incumbent and newly emerging political parties with strongly 
divergent preferences (Hungary, Italy, Japan and Mexico are all examples of this).  
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shows, all the East Asian mixed systems are clearly majoritarian in their 
structure.  
 
 
Table Three: Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in the Asia-Pacific 
Country District 
seats 
District 
system 
List seats List System Total seats 
Japan 300 FPTP 180 List PR 480 
Korea 227 FPTP 46 List PR 273 
Taiwan 188 SNTV 38 List PR 225 
Thailand 400 FPTP 100 List PR 500 
Philippines 209 FPTP up to 53 List PR, with 
3 seat limit 
262 
East Timor 13 FPTP 75 List PR 88 
 
The outcomes of the application of mixed systems in the Asia-Pacific region 
tend to support the findings of the broader scholarly literature. In Russia, for 
example, the introduction of a parallel mixed-member system in 1995 was 
designed to achieve the same goals as most Asia-Pacific reforms: that is, to 
refashion the party system by stimulating the development of national parties, 
consolidate smaller parties into large ones, and produce a more stable 
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legislature.23 More generally, the most comprehensive evaluation of mixed-
member systems to date has concluded that they are more likely than most 
other electoral systems to generate “two-block” party systems, and are more 
likely than any other electoral system to simultaneously generate local 
accountability and a nationally-oriented party system.24 These were precisely 
the goals which most Asian reformers had high on their list of priorities as 
part of their broader quest for political stability. The Asian experience of 
mixed systems thus supports the findings from other regions. 
 
Reinforcing this conclusion is the fact that other countries in the region which 
have not adopted mixed-member systems – such as Cambodia and Indonesia 
-- have also adopted more majoritarian and disproportional electoral models 
in recent years. In keeping with the logic of the political party reforms, these 
have had the effect of penalizing smaller parties, restricting political 
fragmentation, and hence – not incidentally -- promoting the interests of the 
established parties. In Cambodia, for example, successive electoral reforms 
adopted since the restoration of democracy in 1993 have each resulted in 
small steps away from proportionality. Similarly, Indonesia’s 2004 electoral 
system was markedly less proportional than that used at the 1999 elections, 
with most of the smaller parties that gained representation in 1999 failing to 
be re-elected. 
                                                 
23 Robert G. Moser 2003. Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation 
in Russia. Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
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This rejection of proportionality in favour of majoritarian outcomes has, in 
most cases, been quite deliberate. Many years of comparative research has 
clearly identified PR systems as being the foremost institutional variable 
encouraging party multiplicity.25 The increasing use of single-member 
districts in many Asia-Pacific states, the penalties on smaller or regional 
parties, and the increasingly majoritarian nature of electoral system choices, 
reflects a desire to limit political fragmentation and government instability, 
promote more meaningful and programmatic political parties, and encourage 
a greater degree of identification between electors and their elected 
representatives.26 
 
To illustrate this swing towards majoritarianism, Table Four shows the level 
of disproportionality for pre-reform and post-reform elections in Japan, 
Cambodia, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, using 
Lijphart’s measure of the average seat-vote deviation of the two largest 
                                                                                                                                            
24 Matthew S. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenburg (eds) 2001. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: the Best of 
Both Worlds? New York: Oxford University Press, p. 591. 
25 See, for example, Rae, D.W. 1967, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, Yale University Press, 
New Haven; Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M.S. 1989, Seats and Votes: the Effects and Determinants of 
Electoral Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven and London; Lijphart, A. 1994, Electoral Systems and 
Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990, Oxford University Press, New York. 
26 This course of action is supported by research which has found that small district magnitude helps to 
block the rise of ‘fringe’ or extremist parties in established democracies. See Joseph Willey 1998, 
‘Institutional Arrangements and the Success of New Parties in Old Democracies’ in Richard Hofferbert 
(ed), Parties and Democracy. Blackwell: Oxford. 
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parties at each election.27 As the Table shows, in almost all cases, 
disproportionality levels following the reforms were considerably higher than 
the average levels experienced in previous years. In Thailand and Japan, for 
example, the first elections held under the new mixed-member systems 
resulted in rates of disproportionality almost twice that of previous elections. 
As Crossant notes, “The change in vote-seat deviation in the wake of electoral 
reforms is remarkable … [in Thailand] disproportionality rose significantly 
after components of the proportional representation system were introduced. 
The same is true for the Philippines’s party-list system, used for the first-time 
ever in 1998 and again in 2001.”28 Cambodia also saw an increase in 
disproportionality, due in part to the increase in the number of single-
member districts. Only Indonesia, where proportionality actually increased 
between 1999 to 2004, bucks this trend, somewhat surprisingly given the 
marked reduction in average district magnitude there. 
 
Table Four: Electoral Disproportionality in Pre- and Post-Reform Elections 
Country Disproportionality 
average all elections 
Disproportionality 
Post-reform 
Cambodia 5.42 (1993-1998) 7.30 (1998) 
Japan 4.80 (1947-2000) 7.60 (2000) 
                                                 
27 Arend Lijphart 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 
1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
28 Auriel Croissant 2002. ‘Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative Perspective’ in 
Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns and Marei John (eds), Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia. 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Singapore, p. 329. 
Benjamin Reilly: Democratization and Political Reform in the Asia-Pacific 
 31
Korea 7.00 (1988-2000) 7.95 (2000) 
Taiwan 4.20 (1992-2001) 4.3 (2001) 
Thailand 2.70 (1992-2001) 6.04 (2001) 
Philippines 4.46 (1987-1998) 2.60 (1998) 
Indonesia 1.87 (1999-2004) 1.5 (2004) 
Source: Auriel Croissant 2002. ‘Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative 
Perspective’ in Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Bruns and Marei John (eds), Electoral Politics in 
Southeast and East Asia. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Singapore, p. 329; author’s calculations. 
 
Complementing this widespread rejection of proportionality, a third 
distinctive element of electoral system design in the Asia-Pacific has been the 
attempt to forge cross-regional and cross-ethnic politics via interventions in 
the development of political party systems. In general, the recognition of 
minorities through the electoral system in the many Asia countries has been 
achieved through methods other than proportional representation.29 In 
Malaysia, for example, informal ethnic balancing has been achieved through 
‘vote pooling’ arrangements between the Malay (UMNO), Chinese (MCA) 
and Indian (MIC) parties which make up the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition.30 
                                                 
29 Indeed, one of the interesting aspects of electoral system design in East Asia is the way that some of 
the most ethnically-divided countries of the region – such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma – have 
maintained plurality electoral laws. This represents a reversal of the choice of electoral systems in 
Europe, where the earliest moves towards proportional representation came in the ethnically most 
heterogeneous countries. See Rokkan, S. 1970, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative 
Study of the Processes of Development, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, p. 157. 
30 See Horowitz, Donald L. 1991, ‘Making Moderation Pay: the Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict 
Management’ in J.V. Montville (ed), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Lexington Books, 
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Despite being dominated by UMNO, the fact that every Malaysian 
government to date has been comprised of parties representing the country’s 
three major ethnic groups has provided a form of credible commitment that 
future governments will similarly follow this prescription. While the 
institutionalisation of such practices in Malaysia has come at a considerable 
cost to democracy, via increasingly flagrant gerrymandering of constituencies 
and intimidation of opponents, it has nonetheless helped preserve ethnic 
peace in Malaysia. 
 
In Singapore, this kind of ethnic balancing takes place within the main party, 
the PAP, via the use of so-called ‘Group Representation Constituencies’. 
These are multi-member electoral districts of between four and six members, 
which parties contest by presenting a closed list of candidates for the whole 
electorate, at least one of whom must be a Malay or Indian representative. As 
well as ensuring the ongoing dominance of the PAP, such arrangements help 
to ensure a degree of ethnic balancing within both the party and the 
parliament, as it effectively requires all parties to put forward a multi-ethnic 
candidate list as a pre-condition for competing in the election. Singapore also 
uses “best loser” seats for opposition candidates in some circumstances. 
 
Thailand and Indonesia have taken this process a step further by actively 
discriminating in favour of broad-based parties that can command national 
                                                                                                                                            
New York, p. 466; Brown, D. 1994, The State and Ethnic Politics in South-East Asia, Routledge, London and 
New York, p. 235. 
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(rather than regional) support. The outcomes in both cases have been striking. 
In Thailand, the effective number of parties declined from an average of 7.2 in 
the ten-year period from 1986-96 to 3.8 at the first post-reform elections in 
April 2001. In Indonesia, the raw numbers dropped from 48 parties contesting 
the 1999 election to 24 parties at the 2004 poll – again, a fifty percent decline – 
and a similar but less extreme decline in the number of parties represented in 
parliament, from 21 in 1999 to 17 in 2004. Considering that political reforms in 
both countries were aimed at countering party fragmentation, these are 
striking outcomes by any measure. 
 
Of course, retarding political fragmentation has costs as well as benefits. In 
Indonesia, the new laws have helped to reduce excessive candidature and 
fragmentation in what is an extremely heterogeneous society. However, they 
have also benefited incumbent parties by restricting the level of political 
competition, and place real barriers on new entrants into the political 
marketplace.31 Moreover, given that there are now 32 provinces and some 430 
regencies in Indonesia, the laws requiring a minimum number of party 
members in each are truly onerous requirements -- as one commentator noted, 
if the laws are enforced “parties may, instead of collecting dues from 
members, be paying them to sign up in future”.32  
 
                                                 
31 Benjamin Reilly 2003, ‘Political Parties and Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Asia 
Pacific Issues: Analysis from the East-West Center, 71, December 2003, pp. 1-8. 
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Another application of cross-voting rules will take place at the forthcoming 
presidential elections in Indonesia in October 2004. In contrast to the other 
presidential systems in the region (Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines), 
all of which use a plurality method, Indonesia will make use of a two-round 
system, with candidates for the presidency and vice presidency running as a 
team. In order to avoid a second round of voting, first-round winners must 
gain over 50% of all votes as well as a minimum of 20% in half of all 
provinces.33 This latter provision – known in the scholarly literature as a 
“distribution requirement” – was borrowed from Nigeria, another large and 
ethnically diverse country. Again, the aim is to ensure that the winning 
candidate not only has majority support overall, but also is able to attract 
support across most parts of the country as well. In this respect, the 
presidential electoral law is consistent with the centripetal logic of the laws on 
party formation, aiming to promote parties with a cross-regional support 
base.34 
 
Conclusion 
To return to the question posed in the title of this paper – “Is there an Asian 
Model of institutional design?” – the answer appears to be ‘yes’. 
Overwhelmingly, Asian democracies in recent years have chosen mixed-
                                                                                                                                            
32 Paige Johnson Tan 2002, ‘Anti-Party Reaction in Indonesia: Causes and Implications’, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 24(3): 484-508. 
33 The second round of voting, if required, will be a straight runoff between the two leading candidate 
teams, with no distribution requirements. 
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member systems when reforming their electoral arrangements, and have also 
attempted to shape the nature of their emerging party systems. In almost all 
cases, strategies of reform have been strongly majoritarian in both design and 
outcome.  
 
Structurally, this preference for majoritarianism is apparent in four ways. 
First, all mixed-member systems adopted have been ‘parallel’ in nature, 
meaning that there is no compensation of any seats-votes disparities from the 
district seats with seats from a party list. Second, the balance of seats in these 
systems is, in all cases bar East Timor, strongly weighted in favour of the 
district component, so that systems perform more like straight plurality 
contests than like mixed systems in other regions. Third, countries have 
placed restrictions on the proportionality of the PR component of mixed 
systems by the use of explicit thresholds (in the case of Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Korea), manipulation of district size (Indonesia, Cambodia) or restrictions on 
which parties can compete for party list seats (the Philippines). Fourth, 
complementing these electoral reforms, some countries (Thailand, Indonesia) 
have tried to shape the development of their political party systems by 
rewarding national parties and restricting smaller ethnic or regional ones. 
 
It is important to emphasise just how distinctive the Asia-Pacific’s adoption of 
majoritarianism and centripetalism is in comparison to other world regions. 
                                                                                                                                            
34 For more on the concept of ‘centripetalism’, see Benjamin Reilly. 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: 
Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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In Africa, for example, there has been a strong trend in the other direction – 
towards the increasing use of list PR electoral systems – and an equally strong 
tendency towards one-party dominant regimes.35 Similarly, in Latin America, 
democratizing states have, without exception, maintained list PR systems – 
despite the combination of presidentialism and PR being widely blamed for 
political fragmentation and legislative deadlock in many cases.36 Similarly, in 
the new democracies of Eastern Europe, the tendency has been to follow the 
example of Western Europe and introduce highly proportional electoral 
systems with ethnic parties and strong guarantees for minority rights. Indeed, 
the guidelines of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) make this explicit, affirming the right of ethnic minorities to form 
their own parties and compete for office on an ethnic basis.37 
 
By contrast, in Asia, the focus has been on creating more majoritarian political 
systems, reducing overall levels of proportionality, promoting the electoral 
prospects of larger political parties, and restricting the ability of minority 
groups to form parties in the first place. The divergence between the Asia and 
other world regions in this regard is itself the strongest affirmation of a 
                                                 
35 See Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, eds. 1998, The Awkward Embrace: Democracy and 
Dominant-Party Rule in Semi-Developed Countries (London: Harwood Academic Publishers; Andrew 
Reynolds 1999, Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
36 See Mainwaring, S. 1993, ‘Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 26(2):198-228. 
37 See, for example, the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen declaration at www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-
1999/hd/cope90e.htm. 
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distinctively Asian approach to the issue of democratization and institutional 
design.  
 
This is not to suggest that such reforms are necessarily coherent. Indeed, 
mixed incentives appear to be a common problem across the region. For 
example, by limiting the development of regional parties, the Indonesians 
may have improved the prospects for a nationally-consolidated party system, 
but they have also undercut the ability of all but a few established parties to 
form and mobilize support. Ethnic groups that are unable to mobilize and 
compete for political power by democratic means will likely find other ways 
to achieve their ends. If restrictions on regional parties end up encouraging 
extra-constitutional action by aggrieved minorities, they will have 
exacerbated the very problems they are designed to prevent. 
 
Similarly, the Thai reforms, while reducing fragmentation, have excessively 
centralized government power and fostered single-party domination. 
Measures to promote political stability may thus have many unintended 
consequences, including the delegitimizing of the political order and multiple 
unforeseen or even mutually contradictory outcomes.38 The heavy-handed 
nature of these reforms is likely to produce some unusual side-effects. The 
danger of overkill – placing so many incentives in favour of party aggregation 
and against regional or ethnic parties that they form a pattern of systemic 
                                                 
38 Duncan McCargo 2002, ‘Democracy Under Stress in Thaksin’s Thailand’, Journal of Democracy, 
13(4):112-126. 
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discrimination and disempowerment – is clearly present. A balance needs to 
be struck between encouraging national parties, which is in general a positive 
thing, and restricting regional ones, which can have clear downsides. 
 
The final distinctive aspect of East Asian electoral systems is simply how 
much inter-regional borrowing and imitation there has been, and how much 
innovation has taken place over the past decade. This is not simply a 
consequence of democratization or political bargaining, important though 
these have been. Rather, there also appears to be a real willingness in a 
number of transitional Asian democracies to experiment with new forms of 
representation and revised political institutions, a process that may have 
reached its zenith in the extensive constitutional reforms that have taken been 
enacted in Thailand and are now taking place in Indonesia. This willingness 
to experiment is, in part, a response to the troubled democratic history of such 
countries, and particularly the failure of previous attempts at democratization 
due to a combination of weak institutions, fragmented party systems, and 
unstable governments. As such, they represent a distinctively Asian 
contribution to the field of institutional design.  
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